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From his place as a one-man grand jury, Professor Leach indicts
property law of a series of misdemeanors. His charges hardly reach the
level of felony. Indeed the bill of particulars makes it appear that the
offender is really only subject to petty offense jurisdiction. Professor
Leach does not look to the heart of property law for his allegations,
but rather chips away at the ornaments on the fringes.
The indictment was originally prepared as the Stephens Lecture at
the University of Kansas. The substance appears unchanged-prepared
for the ear, not the eye-but the Professor has added footnotes to his
text. As Dean Logan of Kansas writes in a brief introduction, "Connoisseurs of Leachiana frequently run through the footnotes before
bothering with the text."1 The footnotes provide an interesting addition with anecdotes 2 and poetry.3 The burden of the Professor's message
remains in the text.
Professor Leach concentrates his attack on a few of the seemingly
absurd rules of property law. He attacks-certainly not for the first
time4 -- the more unreal parts of the Rule Against Perpetuities, the
narrow interpretation of wills and trusts, and the current conveyancing system in the United States. He has a two-fold plan of action for
reform: (1) the promotion, drafting, and passage of remedial legislation,
and (2) the judicial overruling of certain "bad" decisions of the past.
It is a peculiarity of the American legal system that legislative change
cannot affect the already-vested rights of individuals.5 A property right
* But not of a Villein.
t Assistant Professor, University of Iowa College of Law.
I Foreword at iii.
2 See P. 67 n.83, for his exposition of Srimati Bibhabati Devi v. Kumar Ramendra

Narayan Roy [1946] A.C. 508. This is the case of the Indian prince who was revived by a
rainstorm which extinguished the flames of his own funeral pyre. He wandered for
twelve years with a band of mendicant holy men before returning to reclaim his property.
3 See P. 6 n.7 for a poem about Raymond Syndicate v. Gutentag, 177 Mass. 562 (1901),
and P. 72 n.89 for a poem about Jee v. Audley, I Cox 324 (1787).
4 His previous articles on the subject are collected in W.B. LEcAC & J. LOGAM, CAsEs
AND TExT ON FuruRE INTERESs AND EsPATE PLANNING 835 n.1 (1961).

5 Thus, a judge who decides that some ancient doctrine is absurd and "not a part of
the law" is not depriving the beneficiary who would have taken under the rule of any-
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recognized as fundamental by our English forebears is now sanctified
against all incursion. Hence, any property statute must be prospective
only. If a decision is to be made immediately effective, it must be a
judicial and not a legislative one. Only the courts can correct some of
their self-inflicted wounds of the past. The legislature can act to prevent
the wounds from continuing into the future.
Professor Leach gives the academic a light role in his scheme for
change. The scholar can spend some of his time drafting reform legislation for adoption by his state legislature. Hopefully, his dean or
promotion committee will recognize this diligent draftsmanship as
"publication," for it is "worth a half-dozen abstruse articles in learned
journals which gather dust in university libraries." 6
The legislature, the bar, and the courts all have a significant role to
play in the reform of property law. But Professor Leach unfortunately
understates both the culpability of his brethren of the chair and the
potential for reform which lies in their hands.
If a professor of contract, tort, or criminal law were to suggest the
use of Blackstone's Commentaries as the basic text for an elementary
course in their fields of interest, his colleagues would quietly begin
searching the statutes under "Lunacy," subtitle "Proceedings for
Commitment." If a professor of property, on the other hand, were to
make the same suggestion, it might be received with some greater
tolerance. The law of contract, tort, and crime have undergone substantial changes in the past two centuries. The distinction between trespass and case, as well as the niceties of assumpsit, are matters of legal
history, not of current law. In the field of property, however, there
has been no such substantial reexamination of the basis of the doctrines.
We retain the essential structure which Blackstone gave us. The intervening two centuries have been a period of accretion and consolidation,
but not of fundamental reexamination of the core of the doctrines.
Now Professor Leach tells us that Blackstone is bad. Indeed, Blackstone is the first defendant in the indictment which he delivers to the
reader. 7 But Blackstone can't be all bad, because Leach seems to want
to preserve the Blackstonian system, while tinkering with its details.
The tinkering will help solve problems which have been seen to arise
thing, since the judge only speaks the law. A legislature which makes the same decision is
depriving the beneficiary of property without due process of law. Perhaps some judicial
statesmen should rethink that distinction, as well. (Quaere: does the rule in Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), make judicial restatement of the law as much "state action"
for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment as legislative revision?)
6 P. 85.
7 The full caption of the indictment is "The People v. Blackstone, Kent, Gray, and

Stare Decisis (Accessories: Pontius Pilate and the Laws of the Medes and the Persians)."
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in particular cases, but it will not make the basic doctrines of the law
of property any more relevant to modem society or its framework any
more appropriate to a nonfeudal system.
The real villain of property law is not the legislator who fails to pass
reformatory statutes. He probably acts either out of ignorance or confusion.8 Nor does the judge who perpetuates an absurd feudal principle into the modern age have the necessary intent to be convicted as
an accessory under this indictment.9 The real villain is the academic
who teaches property law as the unchanged and nearly ossified structure
which students generally perceive.
Property law is by its very nature conservative, since it deals primarily with the protection of vested rights and interests. Even with the
constitutional limitations on "taking" of property, it need not be
inflexible. Like Professor Leach, I am "not even a Democrat."'1 I agree
fully that property interests, in some generic sense, must be protected.
I do not agree that there is a fundamental sanctity in a system of
definitions and a structure of organization which proceeds directly from
the requirements of a feudal society. I do not wish to reform property
law in order to make it easier for property interests to be defeated. I
do want to reform property law so that it is basically comprehensible.
Unless it is, it faces greater dangers of more substantial revision.
There are essentially four potential approaches to teaching the law
of property: pedagogical, logical, historical, and functional. Property,
as taught, has been a vehicle for the three former, more than for the
latter.
8 Since Professor Leach refers repeatedly to his Kansan hosts, let me take a Kansas
example. K.S.A. § 58-502 abolishes estates tail by stating in part: "Every instrument...
disposing of property which but for this section would create an estate tail shall create
a life estate in the first taker and a remainder in fee in the next taker." The statute does
not clearly say whether the remainder vests at the time of the first taking or at the time
of the termination of the life estate. The two interpretations would produce different results if there are children born (or if children die) during the tenure of the life tenant. See
also K.S.A. § 58-505, which abolishes the Rule in Wild's Case with similar imprecision.
In Waite v. Schmidt, 173 Kan. 353, 245 P.2d 975 (1952), the Kansas Supreme Court opted
for a vested remainder in the heirs of the body on the date of the original grant. Under
this interpretation, if the grantee had no children living at the date he took his life
estate, the grantor would presumably take a fee simple in reversion.
The legislative action makes only one thing clear. The Kansas legislators thought that
entailed estates were inappropriate in their state. The absence of litigation on the issue
makes it clear that entailed estates have not only been abolished, they have become
irrelevant to a modern society. Patchwork legislation apparently makes it necessary to
teach the entailed estate in order to understand the statutory provision.
9 Professor Leach suggests, for instance, that such an indictment would be appropriate
in the case of Judge Cardozo, for his introduction of the Doctrine of Worthier Title as
a rule of construction in the law of personalty. P. 55.
10 He makes this worthy disclaimer on p. 31.
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The foremost use for most property courses apparently has been as a
vehicle for the inculcation of legal analytic skills. As policy rationales
have crept into criminal law, tort, contract, and even civil procedure,
property has been the course which maintained "pure analysis" despite
the floodtide of change. The "pure analysis" of the common law is
vital to legal education. Only through careful examination of precedents can we obtain such magnificent works as Professor Leach's own.:
Case analysis must be taught somewhere in the law school curriculum.
It is only a pity that in property, which is most in need of fundamental
reexamination, thought should be primarily directed to the old
formalities.
2
The property course can also introduce the student to a complete1
logical system, in which the interrelationship of rules can be demonstrated and the effect of inarticulated hypotheses, either major or minor,
can be minimized. The first defendant in this indictment, Sir William
Blackstone, confessed in his Commentaries that "the doctrine of estates
in expectancy contains some of the nicest and most abstruse learning
in the English law."'13 Property can be used as a vehicle to introduce
the student to, and to force the student to master, niceness and abstruseness in the law. It thus provides the same test of his intellectual prowess
which Roman law provides in the English universities. I would suggest
that Roman law is more appropriate to this task, precisely because it
is clearly not applicable to modern society. The student is not placed in
the dilemma of his logic conflicting with common sense.
As an historical course, property offers many advantages. Whatever
the merits of Sir Henry Maine's specific hypothesis that the law has
changed from status to contract, 14 the property course could easily introduce students to the idea that the law must and does keep pace with
societal change. Legal history, as taught in the light of property courses,
tends, however, to be merely the inculcation of miscellaneous trivia,
justified by the fact that such trivia can occasionally win cases. The
historical property course can be related to the underlying philosophy
which the law represents. Comparative study of the rights of the
property owner (inter-temporal as well as inter-systemic) can serve to
illustrate the dependence of law upon the foundation of relevance
within the current political society. This kind of study would be most
11 W.B. LEACH

&

J. LOGAN, CASES AND TEXT ON FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING

(1961); J. MORRIS & W.B. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUTIES (2d ed. 1962); and A.J.
CASNER & W.B. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY (1964), to mention only a few of the

more significant volumes.
12 If not "compleat."
13 2 IV. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 163 (17th ed. 1830). Since the defendant did not
receive a Miranda warning, this evidence should not be admitted at his trial.
14 H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 170 (8th ed. 1880).
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dangerous for property law in the context of modern society, for everyone (except possibly a property lawyer) knows that feudalism is deadl
The fourth approach to property law is "functional." Professor
Leach claims that this approach originated at Harvard under Dean
Pound and has subsequently been renamed at Yale.15 He also suggests
that it is an approach of the past, having given way to the kind of careful, minute technical change which he proposes. The paternity of the
child is not a matter of much importance but its continued viability
is. The concept of property does serve a particular and important role
in any society. The particular rules which develop for the governance
of property have relationships to the function which the proprietal
institution serves in the social system. The system may be slow in
adjusting the rule of the institution to its modern requirements. It
can develop by the promulgation of particular rules to meet situations
in which the old rules no longer apply. Or it can develop by fundamentally reexamining the requirements of the system. Property law
could start the process with an examination of the role which property
plays in the social system. This can extend to teaching concepts and
techniques as well as to substantive rules. Is Blackacre a useful concept
for teaching rules to students for whom agricultural images may be
wholly foreign? Are the agricultural overtones of much of property
law really applicable in the urban setting? Are the notions of permanence of the proprietary interest useful in a society in which more
than one-half of the population changed residence within a five year
period?'0 Is it at all useful to talk about leases except in the context
of the "standard form" agreement? How far can society permit the
doctrines of future interests to tie up urban land? Can we devise new
systems of ownership to make private "urban renewal" possible, despite
the objection of one property owner? For any of these questions to be
asked or answered, property law must be more than a mere recitation
of the currently established rules, with whatever embellishments may
be added. Neither the student nor the ex-student, now sitting on the
bench, can answer them simply by reference to an existing legal system.
He must deal with the more fundamental issues of the function of
property and of property law in modern society. The law teacher should
provide him with a context in which to decide these fundamental
issues.
In 1458, Chief Justice Fortescue could tell a suitor: "Sir, the law
15 P. 29-31.
16 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BuREAu OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAX ABSTRACT OF THE
UNrED STATES 34-35 (1967). Of 159,004,000 persons age five and over in 1960, only 79,331,000
lived in the same house as in 1955. Between March 1954 and March 1965, 20.7% of the
population moved. In the following year, 19.8% moved.
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is as I say it is, and so it has been laid down ever since the law began;
and we have several set forms which are held as law, and so held and
used for good reason, though we cannot at present remember that
reason, but by study and labor one can find it, and if any such form or
course be used or has been used againstreason, it is not bad to amend it,
... ,,I Surely the modem teacher of the law must apply the same study
and reason which Fortescue demanded of his contemporaries. If the
law is grounded in a reason totally alien to modern society, then fundamental reexamination-not just tinkering with details-is required.
This juror would vote for conviction on the indictment presented
by Professor Leach. But I am tempted to intimate that the prosecutor
should also lay an information against the complaining witness and
several dozen others as accessories to this crime in helping to perpetuate
an archaic system through failure to suggest and provide alternatives
and to subject property law to a penetrating and thorough critical
reexamination.
17 Y.B. 36 Hen. 6, f. 25b-26 (1458). Leach, on p. 2, sets forth all of the quotation except
that set in italics, thus seemingly reversing the meaning. (The translation of the portion
in italics is mine; the translation of that in Roman type is as given by Professor Leach.)

